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BURKET v. COMMONWEALTH: DON'T PUT ALL YOUR DEFENSE EGGS
IN THE SUPPRESSION BASKET
BY: JODY M. BIEBER
Russel Burket entered a plea of guilty to capital murder, apparently
without an agreement that he would be sentenced to life in prison. He
reserved the right to challenge on appeal the admissibility of his confes-
sion. Burket was sentenced to death. Because of the guilty plea, the
confession issue was essentially the only matter providing any hope that
his conviction and death sentence might be reversed on appeal. In Burket
v. Commonwealth1 the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial
court's denial of the motion to suppress Russel Burket's confession. The
Burket decision is not unusual in this respect.2 Quite to the contrary, it
is the quintessential Virginia confession case, replete with examples of
how the state's highest court regularly disposes of defense challenges to
the admissibility of confessions. Given the discretionary nature of
confession-related rulings, the Virginia courts can and do construe
confession law in favor of the Commonwealth. Consequently, when
planning defense strategy it should be assumed that confessions, at least
those essential to the Commonwealth's case if admitted into evidence,
will be upheld on appeal. Pinning one's appellate hopes on this issue is
tantamount to foregoing appeals.
What follows is a brief examination of how Virginia courts gener-
ally construe and apply the confession doctrines in capital cases.
I. WHAT IS CUSTODY?
Important to the issue of whether a confession is admissible is
whether the defendant was in custody. In capital cases, the Supreme
Court of Virginia apparently looks for indicators that the defendant was
not.
1 248 Va. 596,450 S.E.2d 124 (1994). See case summary of Burket,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
2 For examples of the many Virginia capital cases where motions
to suppress confessions were denied, see Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248
Va. 460,450 S.E.2d 379 (1994);Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445,
423 S.E.2d 360 (1992);King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353,416 S.E.2d
669 (1992); Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 422 S.E.2d 380
(1992); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1,419 S.E.2d 606 (1992);
Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121,410 S.E.2d 254 (1991); Cheng v.
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26,393 S.E.2d 599 (1990); Eaton v. Common-
wealth, 240 Va. 236,397 S.E.2d 385 (1990); Mu'Min v. Commonwealth,
239 Va. 433,389 S.E.2d 886 (1990); Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va.
243,389 S.E.2d 871 (1990);Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130,360
S.E.2d 196 (1987); Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313,356 S.E.2d 157
(1987); Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 352 S.E.2d 352 (1987);
Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986); Pruett v.
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 351 S.E.2d 1 (1986); Boggs v. Common-
wealth, 229 Va. 501, 331 S.E.2d 407 (1985); Poyner v. Commonwealth,
229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815 (1985); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227
Va. 124,314 S.E.2d 371 (1984); Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va.
535,323 S.E.2d 577 (1984); Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423,304
S.E.2d 271 (1983); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31,307 S.E.2d
864 (1983); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784
(1979);Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 146,255 S.E.2d 525 (1979);
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978).
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 Id. at 444.
5 Lanier v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 541,555,394 S.E.2d 495,
504 (1990).
In Miranda v. Arizona3 the United States Supreme Court declared
that "[tlhe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 4 These words under-
score the significance of custodial interrogation. It is the custodial nature
of police interrogation that triggers the right to Miranda warnings.5 If a
suspect is not in custody when he makes a confession, then he is not
entitled to the safeguards of Miranda and his statements will be admis-
sible in judicial proceedings. If, however, the suspect is in custody
without the benefit of Miranda warnings and a confession is obtained, the
statements are inadmissible. Thus, the determination of whether or not a
suspect is in custody is often the first bone of contention in a suppression
hearing. The defendant will likely argue that he was in custody without
the benefit of Miranda warnings, while the Commonwealth will main-
tain that the suspect was not in custody at the time of the confession.
6 It
is the duty of the trial court to make a custody determination based on all
the facts and circumstances 7 and from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the suspect's position. 8 In order to be in custody for purposes
of Miranda there must be a restriction on the individual's freedom. In
Wass v. Commonwealth9 the court described custody as "[c]ircumstances
which deprive a person of his freedom to leave or freedom of action." 10
The court then provided a set of factors to guide the custody determina-
tion, cautioning that the list was non-exhaustive. 1t The effort of the
Wass court to identify the full spectrum of factors affecting the custody
6 Miranda warnings are not implicated in "general questioning of
citizens in thefact-finding process."Miranda v.Arizona,384 U.S. at477.
See Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. at 272, 351 S.E.2d at 4.
7 See Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27,32,359 S.E.2d 836,
839 (1987); Lanier, 10 Va. App. at 554,394 S.E.2d at 503.
8 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,442 (1984) (stating that
"the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood his situation."). See also Wass v.
Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. at 35, 359 S.E.2d at 840 (holding that "no
reasonable person [in Wass' situation] would have felt free to leave");
Lanierv. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. at 555,394 S.E.2d at 504 (holding
that "a reasonable man in Lanier's position" would have felt free to
leave).
9 5 Va. App. 27, 359 S.E.2d 836 (1987).
10 5 Va. App. at 32, 359 S.E.2d at 839. Wass was a non-capital case
in which the defendant lost his motion to suppress at the trial level but
won the issue on appeal.
11 "[Flactors that must be considered are whether a suspect is
questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings, the number of police
officers present, the degree of physical restraint, and the duration and
character of the interrogation. Whether or when probable cause to arrest
exists and when the suspect becomes the focus of the investigation are
relevant factors to consider. 'Mhe language used by the officer to
summon the individual, the extent to which he or she is confronted with
evidence of guilt, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the
duration of the detention and the degree of pressure applied to detain the
individual' may be significant factors as well." Wass v. Commonwealth,
5 Va. App. at 32-33, 359 S.E.2d at 839 (citations omitted).
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determination indicates the high degree of subjectivity involved in the
judicial evaluation.
When a suspect has not been formally arrested there is simply no
magic formula for determining whether he is in custody for purposes of
Miranda. Each party must persuade the trial court that its account of the
interrogation and the inferences to be drawn from the surrounding
circumstances are correct. It is therefore imperative for the defense to
convince the court that the interrogation was conducted in a coercive and
police dominated environment 12 and that any reasonable person in the
suspect's shoes would not have felt free to leave.
Unfortunately for the Virginia defendant, more often than not trial
courts rule in favor of the Commonwealth on the custody issue, and, in
modem capital cases, this is always the outcome. 13 Although the totality
of the circumstances must be considered by the trial court from the
perspective of the suspect, the courts seem to concentrate on "'whether
there is a formal arrest orrestraint on freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with a formal arrest." 14 This inquiry tends to shift the court's
focus from the suspect himself and the reasonable man in his shoes to the
officers involved in the interrogation. Furthermore, if there is any
evidence that the defendant was told by police that he was free to go or
that he was not under arrest, the court is prone to find that the suspect was
not in custody.
15
To compound the disadvantages faced by the defense, review of
suppression motions is conducted on the familiar standard that the
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's custody determination
unless plainly wrong.16 The trial courts are encouraged to make specific
findings17 which are later reviewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. 18 Given this high level of deference, the lower court's
resolution of the custody inquiry is critical and, in most instances, final.
II. INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
It is the duty of law enforcement officers to put the suspect on notice
of his Miranda rights at the outset of a custodial interrogation. Included
in this set of rights is the right to consult with counsel prior to questioning.
Once the individual is informed of his rights, the decision then becomes
his whether and when to request the presence of counsel. In Edwards v.
Arizona 19 the United States Supreme Court held that once an individual
has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,
12 Id.
13 See supra note 2.
14 Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. at 32, 359 S.E.2d at 839
(quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983))(quoting
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977)).
15 SeePruettv. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 351 S.E.2d I (holding
that defendant was not under arrest and that defendant knew that he was
free to leave the interview at any time); Lanier v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.
App. 541,394 S.E.2d 495 (holding that the record supports a finding that
a reasonable man in defendants position would not have believed his
freedom of movement so curtailed to the degree of formal arrest); Burket
v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596,450 S.E.2d 124 (holding that defendant
was not formally arrested or deprived of his freedom of movement until
after he confessed).
16 Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 249, 349 S.E.2d 161
(1986).
17 Id.
18 Wass, 5 Va. App. at 27, 359 S.E.2d at 836.
19 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
20 Id. at 484-85.
21 Smith v.Illinois,469 U.S. 91,94-95 (1984) (percuriam); See also
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 (1984).
[the suspect] is not subject to further interrogation by authorities until
counsel has been made available to him .... -20 Edwards embodies a
bright-line rule, requiring that all questioning terminate after the accused
requests counsel. 21 The protection of Edwards therefore hinges on
activating the right to counsel. Whether or not the suspect has actually
invoked this right is often a major issue in the suppression hearing.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has traditionally employed the rigid
requirement that suspects clearly and unequivocally invoke the right to
counsel, resolving any and all ambiguities in favor of the Common-
wealth. This narrow approach was recently approved by the United
States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States.22 In Davis the Court
specifically ruled on what degree of verbal expression is required of the
suspect to halt custodial questioning. Prior to Davis there was no
consensus among the lower courts as to what combination of words and
phrases constituted an effective request for an attorney. 23 Thus, in a
much anticipated decision, the Court resolved the issue by requiring that
the request for counsel be clear and unambiguous in order to effectively
trigger Edwards.24
In a trilogy of capital cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia devel-
oped its approach to the invocation issue, now approved in Davis. In
Bunch v. Commonwealth25 the court refused to suppress the defendant's
confession. In its review of the interrogation, the court noted that the
defendant's statement was "couched in ambiguous terms to the effect
that he might want to talk to a lawyer.' 26 In Poyner v. Commonwealth27
the court held that the defendant's statement, "Didn't you say I have a
right to counsel?", was not a request for counsel. 28 Relying on Bunch,
the court stated that "[a]t most, it sought to clarify one of the rights of
which he had already been advised."29 In a similar vein, the defendant
in Eaton v. Commonwealth30 asked police, "You did say I could have an
attorney ifI wanted one?" 3 1 In finding that this statement fell short of an
invocation of the right to counsel, the court finally announced "the
standard prevailing in Virginia is that a request for counsel must be
'unambiguous and unequivocal' in order to trigger the Edwards rule."
32
As these three cases, and the more recent Burket decision, reveal a
suspect's request for counsel is often ambiguous or equivocal. Indeed in
Davis the Supreme Court conceded "that requiring a clear assertion of the
right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who-because of
fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons-
will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually
22 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1990).
23 In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 96 n.3, the Court summarized the
varying standards employed by the jurisdictions. "Some courts have
held that all questioning must cease upon any request for or reference to
counsel, however equivocal or ambiguous .... Others have attempted
to define a threshold standard of clarity for such requests, and have held
that requests falling below this threshold do not trigger the right to
counsel.... Still others have adopted a third approach, holding that when
an accused makes an equivocal statement that 'arguably' can be con-
strued as a request for counsel, all interrogation must immediately cease
except for narrow questions designed to 'clarify' the earlier statement
and the accused's desires respecting counsel."
24 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
25 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271 (1983).
26 225 Va. at 433,304 S.E.2d at 276 (emphasis in original).
27 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815 (1985).
28 229 Va. at 410, 329 S.E.2d at 823.
29 Id.
30 240 Va. 236,397 S.E.2d 385 (1990).
31 240 Va. at 250, 397 S.E.2d at 393.
32 240 Va. at 253, 397 S.E.2d at 395.
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want to have a lawyer present.' 33 Recognizing this reality, the Court
encouraged "the good police practice" of clarifying whether or not the
suspect wants an attorney.
34
As it now stands nothing short of"I want a lawyer" ever has or ever
will qualify as an invocation of the right to counsel in Virginia. This
means that police may continue to conduct interrogations when the intent
of the accused to invoke his right to counsel is clear but his choice of
words is not.35 Further, even a clear request for counsel may be
unavailing if accompanied by additional requests. In King v. Common-
wealth36 the defendant told police that "he wanted to make a statement
but wanted to make it in the presence of 'an attorney for himself,
somebody from the Commonwealth's Attorney's office, and Becky...
and Becky's lawyers."' 37 King clearly articulated his wish for a lawyer
but the court nevertheless characterized the request as equivocal, "being
couched in terms of his willingness to make a statement conditioned not
only upon the presence of his own attorney but also the presence of a cast
of characters having no discernible relevance.... -38 The message seems
to be thatnot only must the suspect's languagebe crystal clearbuthe must
condition his willingness to speak only on the presence of an attorney.
The bottom line on this issue is not encouraging. In light of the
Commonwealth's historic approach to the invocation issue, it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court's invitation in Davis to clarify ambigu-
ous requests will receive widespread acceptance in Virginia. Whenever
police perceive any ambiguity in the words or actions of the suspect, the
request for counsel will generally be denied and any subsequent assign-
ments of error face a fate similar to that of every capital defendant who
has to date uttered anything suggesting an invocation of his right to
counsel. This is clearly one context in which actions are deemed not to
speak louder than extremely succinct words.
m. WAIVING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND
VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
The Supreme Court of Virginia opinions also indicate that, while
capital defendants do not know exactly how to claim constitutional
rights, they are very good at intelligently waiving them.
After a suspect has effectively invoked his Miranda right to counsel
he may waive the privilege if he so desires, but the waiver is not valid
unless the prosecution carries an undefined "heavy burden" of proof.39
33 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
34 Id. at 2356.
35 Id.
36 243 Va. 353, 416 S.E.2d 669 (1992).
37 243 Va. at 361,416 S.E.2d at 673. Becky was King's wife and
codefendant and was also charged with capital murder.
38 243 Va. at 360, 416 S.E.2d at 672.
39 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
40 Quite apart from issues of Miranda warnings and right to counsel
claims, of course, involuntary confessions are inadmissible. SeeArizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 500 U.S. 938 (1991).
41 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
42 This determination also rests on a facts and circumstances test in
which the court must examine the suspect's age, intelligence, back-
ground, experience with the law, length of the interrogation, and evi-
dence of any police misconduct.
43 Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423,434,304 S.E.2d 271,277
(1983).
44 See Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 352 S.E.2d 352
(1987); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121,410 S.E.2d 254 (1991).
45 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). Accord
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1,419 S.E.2d 606 (1992); Correll v.
Not only must the Commonwealth show that the waiver was made
knowingly and intelligently, but it must also demonstrate that any
confessions obtained were voluntary. 40 By meeting its burden, the
Commonwealth will withstand any challenges made by the defense.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that to be valid a
"waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of
the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it."4 1 Whether an accused makes a knowing and intelligent
waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances of each case.42 This
broad standard gives Virginia courts the opportunity to zero in on any
factor suggesting waiver. For example, the focus is often on whether the
suspect has had any experience with the criminal justice system. If the
suspect is not a "novice in police matters,"'43 then the court will be
inclined to find a valid waiver.44
The court must also determine whether the suspect's confession
was voluntary. In determining voluntariness the courts must discern
whether the suspect's statement is the "product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker" or whether the maker's will "has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired." 45
Even though the Virginia courts admit that they cannot discern the
motives of an individual who elects to talk to thepolice,4 6 they are willing
to find voluntariness on two post hoe grounds.
First, the courts tend to heavily credit any expert testimony to the
effect that the suspect had the capacity to understand his Miranda rights
as they were read to him. In Washington v. Commonwealth,47 for
example, the trial court accepted the testimony of a Central State Hospital
clinical psychologist in denying the motion to suppress Washington's
confession. Washington had an I.Q. of 69 and claimed that his interroga-
tors took advantage of his diminished capacity in the interrogation by
conducting a very long and confusing session. Based on a competency
examination, the doctor opined that the defendant exhibited a capacity to
understand his rights and had a basic familiarity with the criminal justice
system and its terminology. The court found that the doctor's testimony
provided amplefactual supportforthe trial court's finding of voluntariness,
a finding which was not plainly wrong.
48
The trial court's own observations of the suspect in the suppression
hearing also heavily influence the voluntariness determination. In Wright
v. Commonwealth49 the trial court concluded from the defendant's
appearance that he had considerably higher intelligence than tests
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 352 S.E.2d 352 (1987); Stockton v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124,314 S.E.2d 371 (1984), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 902 (1991);Jenkinsv. Commonwealth,244 Va. 445,423 S.E.2d 360
(1992).
46 Mundyv. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App.461,476,390 S.E.2d525,
533 (1990).
47 228 Va. 535,545-46,323 S.E.2d 577,584-85 (1984). See also
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1,419 S.E.2d 606 (1992).
48 One of the reasons for the requirement that confessions be
voluntary is concern about the reliability of those that are not. In spite of
numerous inconsistencies between Earl Washington's confession and
the way the crime had to have been committed, his conviction and death
sentence were upheld throughout the court system. DNA evidence
ultimately established almost certainly his innocence and the governor
commuted his sentence to life. See Murray v. Washington, 4 F.3d 1285
(4th Cir. 1993); and case summary of Washington, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 8. See also Simpson, Confessions and the
Mentally Retarded Capital Defendant: Cheating to Lose, Capital De-
fense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 2 8 (1994).
49 245 Va. 177,427 S.E.2d 379 (1993).
Page 46 - Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2
revealed and also possessed "street smarts" surpassing his formal level
of education. Thus the court upheld the validity of the waiver at issue and
the voluntariness of the confession thereafter made by Wright.
In stark contrast to the clarity and specificity required for an
invocation of the right to counsel, a suspect's waiver of this right can be
shown by mere circumstance. In North Carolina v. Butler50 the United
States Supreme Court held that "an express written or oral statement of
waiver of rights is not required ... waiver can be inferred from the actions
and words of theperson interrogated." 51 Implied waivers are often found
by the courts in the context of interrupted interrogations. Basically, the
initial waiver is presumed to remain in effect in subsequent questioning
sessions unless the suspect affirmatively revokes the waiver.
The Virginia courts often resort to this form of waiver in order to
uphold the admissibility of confessions. 52 A capital case in point is
Cheng v. Commonwealth.53 The suspect was advised of his Miranda
rights and shortly thereafter gave non-incriminating statements to an
officer. The next day the suspect encountered a different officer with
whom he was acquainted and eventually made a confession without a
renewal of his Miranda warnings. The court found that the suspect's
initial decision to talk constituted an implied waiver of Miranda render-
ing his subsequent incriminatory statements admissible.
54
As illustrated above, the Virginia courts adhere to the proposition
that once a suspect has made a valid waiver of his rights, the waiver will
remain in effect throughout subsequent interrogations. This presumption
of a continuing waiver is overcome only when the suspect reasonably
exhibits a desire to revoke it.55 This means thatMiranda warnings do not
have to be renewed after a break in the interrogation.
Thus far the Supreme Court of Virginia has demonstrated a great
reluctance to overrule trial court findings of valid waivers and voluntary
confessions. This unwillingness is attributable to the fact-intensive
nature of these dual inquiries. In Mundy v. Commonwealth56 the Court
spoke of its role on review as "determin[ing] whether, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, the trial court was plainly wrong in
concluding that [the suspect's] statement to the [police] was essentially
a free and unconstrained choice on his part or, put another way, that his
will was not overborne." 57 Once again the standard of review is highly
deferential to the observations and impressions of the trial judge.
IV. HONORING THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Finally, in Virginia, once a suspectunderstands and claims theright
to remain silent, the police can nevertheless keep trying to elicit state-
ments.
50 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
51 Id. at 373.
52 See Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385
(1990); Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986);
Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423,304 S.E.2d 271(1983); Simmons
v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 111, 300 S.E.2d 918 (1983); McFadden v.
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 103, 300 S.E.2d 924 (1983).
53 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599 (1990).
54 240 Va. at 35-36, 393 S.E.2d at 604.
55 Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 548-49, 323 S.E.2d at
586.
56 11 Va. App. 461, 399 S.E.2d 29 (1990).
57 11 Va. App. at 475, 390 S.E.2d at 532 (quoting Rodgers v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605,609,318 S.E.2d 298,300 (1984)(empha-
sis added)).
58 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
59 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
60 Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
61 Id.
Once Miranda warnings are given to the suspect if he "indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease."'58 In Michigan v. Mosley59
the United States Supreme Court held that this directive does not mean
that the police may never resume interrogation after a suspect asserts his
right to silence. Rather, the suspect's right must be "scrupulously
honored" by the police after it is invoked. If there is further interrogation
and a subsequent confession, its admissibility is to be judged by consid-
eration of five factors: first, whether the suspect was initially informed
"that he was under no obligation to answer any questions and could
remain silent if he wished"; 60 second, whether the interrogation was
immediately halted and the interrogators did not try to coax the suspect
into reconsidering his decision to remain silent;6 1 third, whether the
officers resumed questioning "only after the passage of a significant
period of time";62 fourth, whetherMiranda warnings were given before
the commencement of a second round of questioning;63 and fifth,
whether the second interrogation was limited to a crime that was not at
issue in the first interrogation.64
As with the custody and invocation issues, defense challenges
based on Mosley grounds generally are found by the Supreme Court of
Virginia to be misplaced. A prime example of the Commonwealth's
treatment of a Mosley claim is found in Weeks v. Commonwealth.65 In
the course of a custodial interview in a motel room, Weeks exercised his
right to remain silent which was honored at that time by the interrogating
officer. Approximately ten hours later in a police station lounge, the same
officer initiated a second interview in which he relayed newly developed
evidence tending to inculpate Weeks. The interrogation concerned the
same crime. At this time Weeks was restrained in handcuffs and leg irons.
More importantly, Weeks was not readvised of his rights; rather, he was
asked if he understood the rights that were earlier read. After informing
Weeks of the case against him, the detective said, "This is your oppor-
tunity to provide your explanation as to what happened at the shooting
scene."'66 Weeks eventually confessed to committing murder.
Based on the forgoing, Weeks moved the trial court to suppress his
confession. The motion was denied. The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the ruling, finding no violation of Miranda under the fourth and
fifth prongs of the Mosley test.67 In Mosley the defendant invoked his
right to remain silent, at which time police stopped questioning him and
placed him in ajail cell. Within afew hours a different police officer, who
wished to question Mosley about a different crime went, to the cell and
reissued the Miranda warnings. Mosley then agreed to answer questions.
On these facts the court found that police had scrupulously honored
Mosley's rights. 68
62 Id. at 106.
63 Id. at 104.
64 Id.
65 248 Va. 460, 450 S.E.2d 379 (1994). See case summary of
Weeks, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
66 Weeks, 248 Va. at 469, 450 S.E.2d at 385.
67 248 Va. at 471-72, 450 S.E.2d at 386-87.
68 Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
69 See Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 260, 435 S.E.2d 636
(1993) and case summary of Dubois, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No.
1, p. 28 (1993).
70 The Supreme Court of Virginia has repeatedly held in capital
cases that "[w]hen an accused enters a voluntary and intelligent plea of
guilty to an offense he waives all defenses except those jurisdictional."
Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534,538,391 S.E.2d 276,278 (1990).
However, most recently in Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 450
S.E.2d 124 (1994), the court reviewed penalty phase issues raised by the
defense, in spite of a guilty plea entered by the defendant.
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In clear contrast stand the facts of Weeks. Not only did the same
officer fail to readvise Weeks of his Miranda rights, but the second
interrogation was centered on the very crime that had been the subject of
the first interrogation. Although the Court found otherwise, these facts on
their face appear to violate both the fourth and fifth prongs of the Mosley
test. Yet once again we see not only an unwillingness by the Supreme
Court of Virginia to disturb the findings of the trial courts but also a broad
reading of the Mosley rule in order to preserve the integrity of the
admission.
V. PLEADING GUILTY AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES
Motions to suppress confessions must, of course, be made and
litigated with all the skill at defense counsel's command. Although the
Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to find an inadmissible confession in
a modem capital case, suppression motions may occasionally succeed at
the trial court level and go unreported in appellate decisions. Neverthe-
less, defense strategy should be formulated with knowledge that, in a
capital case, chances of success on suppression motions are slim to none.
This makes it particularly important that a plea of guilty not be entered
in a capital case absent an assurance that the sentence will not be death.
69
In the event of a death sentence, such a decision to plead guilty drops a
number of potentially life-saving eggs from the appellate basket.70 As
has been demonstrated in this article, if the only egg left is review of the
admission of a confession, then the basket in Virginia is virtually empty.
NOT HOLDING THE BALANCE NICE, CLEAR AND TRUE:
THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE
BY: JOHN M. DelPRETE
I. INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of trial judges in the Commonwealth of Virginia
are competent individuals who impartially and diligently perform the
duties of theirjudicial office.1 However, as is true of any large group of
professionals, one will always encounter some who fail to uphold the
standards of their profession. It is those few that this article intends to
address.
The duty to remain impartial is perhaps the most important respon-
sibility of the trial judge. This not only requires that thejudge be impartial
in fact, but that he or she appears unbiased.2 Perhaps because of the
inherently inflammatory nature of many capital murder trials, this
responsibility is sometimes abdicated. Prosecutorial favoritism, which
can range from subtle remarks to outright harassment of defense wit-
nesses, is one manifestation of the problem. For the defense attomey,
combatting such bias is not only difficult but perilous, as most judges do
not appreciate the suggestion that they might be anything less than
neutral. This article provides suggestions for the defense attorney faced
with a biased judge and is intended to serve as an overview of the relevant
state and federal authority addressing the issue of judicial bias and
disqualification.
Part It will examine the federal constitutional right to an impartial
judge, Part III the constitutional and ethical standards for recusal in
Virginia, PartIV the administrative remedy available inVirginia through
the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, and Part V the federal
statutory guidelines governing recusal. Finally, Part VI will discuss the
various strategies and options available to defense counsel faced with a
biased judge.
1 For example, circuit court judges in small, rural Buckingham
County, expressing doubts about the ability of the defendant to receive
a fair trial before the sitting judges, voluntarily requested the Supreme
Court of Virginia appoint an outside trial judge to preside over the
penalty phase of a capital murder trial. The judges stated that they were
"so situated in respect to this case as in their opinion to render it improper
that they should preside. .. ." Commonwealth v. Tate, CR-744 (Cir. Ct.
of Buckingham County Jan. 27, 1995).
2 Nonverbal behavior can pose a serious threat tojudicial impartial-
II. DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL JUDGE
A fair trial is a basic requirement of due process, guaranteed by both
the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. A fair trial requires that a neutral and detached judge preside over
theproceedings. 3 Just as the defendant's right to ajury trial encompasses
the right to an impartial jury, a defendant has a constitutional right to an
impartial judge. As Justice Black explained:
Fairness ... requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. [O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness. To this end ... no man is
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.
4
This standard found its origins in Tumey v. Ohio,5 where a unani-
mous Court held that due process of law is violated when the liberty or
property of a defendant is subject "to the judgment of a court, the judge
of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching
a conclusion against him in his case."'6 In Tumey the judge was
compensated by fines generated from convictions. Even though the
evidence clearly showed that the defendant was guilty, this was held not
to preclude his complaint that he was denied due process.7
In Ward v. Village of Monroeville8 the Court reaffirmed Tumey,
stating that
ity. See Note, Judges NonVerbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to
Judicial Impartiality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1266 (1975).
3 In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), the right to an
impartial judge was one of three rights designated as so basic to a fair trial
that its infringement could never be treated as harmless error.
4 In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
5 273 U.S. 510 (1926).
6 Id. at 523.
7 Id. at 535.
